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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of· Virginia 
AT RICIIMOND. 
Record No. 1750 
. NORFLEET BELL, Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, Defendant in Error.· 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorable Chief Justice a;nd Justices of the Supreme 
Court of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, Norfleet Bell, respectfully represents unto 
the Court that he is aggrieved by the final judgment of the 
Circuit Court of Nansemond County, Virginia, rendered on 
the 16th day of July, 1935, on an indictment wherein the· 
Commonwealth of Virginia was plaintiff, and the said Norfleet 
Bell was defendant, and 'vherein the said defendant was 
charged with murder and convicted of murder in the second 
degree. An abridged narrative of the record and of the 
facts of the case is herewith presented. 
FACTS. 
It is not deemed expedient, since the abridged facts set 
forth in the record itself are deeidedly concise, to encumber 
this brief with a reiteration of those facts. Reference is ex-
pressly made to the record and .to Bill of Exception No. 1 
therein contained and duly certified by the Court. 
In reality the facts of. the. case, regardless of the manner 
and form stated, are not materially important to the discus-· 
sion of the errors complained of owing to the fact that those: 
errors are plainly questions of law and not ·Of fact. 
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COMMONWEALTH ATTORNEY'S OROSS EXAMINA-
TION OF WITNESSES AS TO OFFENCES COM-
MITTED B.Y THEM-FELONIES AND MIS-
DEMEANORS, TRIALS AND PlJNISH-
. MENTS OF SUCH WITN:~s)nS:. ' 
Perusal of the facts as shown by the record and certified 
by the Court will disclose that the Comlilonwealth 's Attorney 
in his case was permitted, over the repeated objections of 
defense counsel, to ask witness after witness whether such 
witness had been previously convicted of this, that and the 
other crime, felonies and misdemeanors alike, even stealing 
of wood, chickens or fish. This was ·manifestly improper, 
prejudicial and distracted the attention of the jury from the 
pending case and was generally harmful in ·all respects. (See 
Record, pp. 17;20.)· While some very- early Virginia cases 
may have permitted of a limited hiquhj o·f this nature, no 
case, early or late, has ever sanctioned such questions as 
were propounded in this trial, while ·all of the recent Virginia 
cases have held" that the simplest inquiries· to the effect set 
forth not only constitute error, but reversible error, whether 
such questions are directed at the accused or witnesses. They 
a.re improper and reversible even· though ~he general reputa-
tion of an a.Ccu·sed or witnesses has been put in issue which 
was not true in this case as to·~ny witness offered before the 
Court. The authorities ·are ulliversal that ev~n where gen-
eral reputation has been introduced by the defendant either 
as· to himself or as to any of his witnesses, the Common-
wealth can attack that general reputation by other witnes~s 
·testifying as to general. reputation only, and not as to PAR-
TICULAR occurrences, offenses or acts of misconduct. In 
the instant case the only reputation brought into the case 
was that of the accused, and it was definitely shown that 
his reputation was good, that he had never been arrested 
or charged with an offense previously, and the Common-
wealth did not attempt to disput those disclosures. S'o that 
since no witnesses' reputation was proved or offered to be 
proved by the defendant, the Court would have ·been in 
error to have permitted the Commonwealth to introduce proof 
as to even the general reputation of such witnesses (unless 
as to truth and veracity-perjury or subornation of per-
jury), useless, therefore, to -argue that the Commonwealth 
was without semblance of ·right to examine the conduct, acts 
and deeds of such witnesses With reference to particular 
occurrences covering the range of their life--specifically point-
ing out and emphasizing PARTICULAR offenses, all of which 
in this case .disclosed simple misdemeanors. 
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· More· prolonged comment upon this question would be riot 
·only useless but wasteful· of the time of counsel preparing 
this -brief, ·likewise of the time of this Court in reading the 
same. 
. The most recent case by this Court upon this question is 
that of Harold v. Commonwealth, 147 Va., where Justice 
Burks, delivering the opinion, comments on the respective 
pages following, as follows: 
' Page 620-In quoting from Walker v. Commonwealth, 1 
Leigh (28 Va.) 574, approving Justice Brockenbrough, and 
quoting from that decision: -
: ''It is certainly true, that, in public prosecutions for a 
specific offense, it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove 
that the offense which is charged has been committed; he is 
not allowed to go into" proof of the commission of any other 
offense than that charged or of the character of the prisoner, 
unless the prisoner himself opens the way for the admission . 
of that evidence by putting his character in issue; and even 
in that case, the prosecutor cannot prove particular facts, but 
must content himself with evidence of general character." 
(Italics supplied.) . . · 
On page 621, quoting from the same case : 
"But if they (such offenses) denote other guilt, they are 
not only irrelevant,- but they do inj~try, because they have a 
tendency to prejudice the minds of the jury; and· for this 
additional reason they attght to be excluded." (Italics sup-
plied.) 
On page 621, Justice Burks also distinguishes previous .Vir-
ginia cases which the Commonwealth relied upon to this 
effect: 
''The Attorney-General relied on Hunt v. 0 om., 126 Va. 
815, 101 S. E. 896; Harris v. Com., 129 Va. 751, 105 S. E. 541, 
and Messer~v. Com., No.1, 145 Va. 838, 133 S. E. 76, to sup-
port a different docbine, but they do not sustain him.'' 
And on page 622: 
· "As we have just stated, the evidence was not admissible 
against the accused as a defendant. Neither was it admissible 
against him as a witness. Whatever may be the rule else-
where, it is well settled in this State that the character of a 
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'witness fo·r veracity cannot be impeached by proof of a prior 
conviction of crime, unless the crime be one which involved 
the character of the witness for veracity. Nor can a witness 
be impeached by proof of collateral facts irrelevant to the 
issue, though they have a bearing• on the question of veracity. 
(Italics supplied.) Uhl v. Com., 6 Gratt. (47 Va.) 706; Lang-
horne v. Com., 76 Va. 1016; Cutchin v. Roanoke, 113 Va. 453, 
74 S. E. 403; Allen v. Com., 122 :Va. 834, 94 S. E. 783." 
The above case is the last word in Virginia, and it would 
certainly seem that the last quotation above is too plain 
to be misunderstood. 
In .Allen v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 834, Justice Prentis, 
at pages 841 and 842, upon this question, for the Court, said: 
"In this State it may be regarded as settled that such ques-
tions cannot be asked. In Uhl's Case, 6 Gratt. (47 Va.) 706, it 
was held that the record of conviction of a witness of petty 
larceny, in another State, is not admissible to impeach the 
veracity of the witness. In Langhorne's Case, 76;v'a.1021, the 
court says : 'It is competent in order to discredit a witness, 
to offer evidence attacking his character for truth and 
veracity. Particular independent facts, though bearing on 
the qu.estion of ve·racity, cannot, however, be put in evidence 
/0'1· this purpose.' '' (Italics supplied.) 
And continuing further, said on page 842: 
''The test as to whether a matter is material or collateral, 
in the matter of impeachment of a witness, is whether or 
not the cross ·examining party would be entitled to prove 
it in support of his case. State v. Goodwin, 32 W. Va. 177, 
9 S. E. 85; State v. Sheppard, 49 W. Va. 582, 39 S. E. 676." 
In Norfolk tt Western Ry. Co. v. Eley, 152 Va., at page 773, 
Justice Campbell, while predicating his remarks upon the 
prejudicial effect of improper remarks of counsel, we think 
the language appropriate and applicable to the cross exami-
nation of witnesses such as occurred in this case, for instance, 
on pages 778-779: 
"Witnesses cannot b.e impeached in this manner. If it wa..~ 
desired to impeach these witnesses, either as to integrity or 
as to veracity, some one shoUld have been called who was· 
~t.nder the SO!Ju;tity of an oath and subject to the oraeaZ of. 
cross exa;mination." (Italics supplied.) · 
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On page 779: 
''The harshness of a verdict in a criminal case or the exorbi-
tant amount of damages awarded in a. civil case may be the 
criterion applicable to a particular case, but this rule is not 
exclusive. When it is 'made tu appear that a litigant ha.s not 
been afforded a fair and impartial trial, this court will over-
lO'ok technical refinements wnd remand the case fo1· a new 
trial." (Italics supplied.) 
On page 780, quoting from Wabash R. Co. v. Billings, 212 
Til.: 
" 'Counsel for defendant interposed an objection to such 
a course of argument, and the court sustained it, and said 
to the jury that the remarks were improper, and that they 
·should disregard them and decide the ease upon the merits, 
and according to the law as the court should give 'it in the in-
structions. Such a statement by counsel is wholly indefensi-
"ble, a;nd unless it can, be seen that it did· not result in injury 
to the defendant, the judgment ought to be reversed on ac-
count of it.''' (Italics supplied.) 
And on. page 781, quoting from RinP-hart & Dennis ·co. v. 
Brown, 137 Va. 679 : 
'' 'All that can be, safely laid down is, that whenever in the 
exercise of a sound discretion it, appears to the court tha.t 
the jury may have been influenced as to their verdict by such 
extrinsic matters, however thoughtlessly or innocently uttered, 
or that the statements were made by counsel in a conscious 
and defiant disregard of his duty, then the verdict should be 
set aside.' '' (Italics supplied.) 
In the case of Cutchins v. Roanoke, 113 Va. 452, at pages· 
473-474, the following appears in the opinion of the Court:· 
''Assignment of error No. 7 calls in question the rulings 
shown in bills of exceptions 14 and 15. They deal with the 
witness, Bertie A. Martin, who testified that she was in the 
defendant's office two years ago; that he locked the door, put 
the key in his pocket, pulled down the blinds, and commenced 
to take liberties with her;·· that she commenc-ed to cry, and 
finally he let her go. 
''In order to impeach this testimony, witnesses were of-
fered to prove her reputation for chastity, but. the court de-
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clined to allow the defendant to introduce proof along that 
line. 
''In Langhorne's case, 76 Va. 1012, it was held that it was 
not permissible to ask a witness if he had not been convicted 
of an offense which did not involve his character for truth 
on oath. 
"And in Uhl 's case, 6 Gratt. ( 47 Va.) 706, it was held that 
the record of the conviction of a witness for petty larceny 
in another State is not admissible evidence to impeach the 
veracity of the witness. And it was further held that a. party 
seeking to impeach a witness will not be allowed to ask what 
the general character of the ~yitness is in relation to other 
matters, as well as to his veracity. 
''Any other rule would involve the court in an endless in-
'yestigation of matters wholly collateral to the issue under 
trial.'' 
Under this sub-division we are likewise inclined to quote 
from Judge William H. Sargeant, of the Corporation Court 
of Norfolk City, merely because the occurrence has been very 
recent and published iu the Norfolk newspapers, in the case 
of Commonwealth v. Robert Crenshaw, in which case it ap-
pears, the following occurred : 
Commonwealth's Attorney addressing a woman witness. 
''Q. What is your address' 
''A. 500 Plume St. 
"By the Commonwealth's Attorney: Isn't that the County 
Jail! 
"Counsel for defendant protested and the J ude:e im-
mediately declared a mistrial. '' . 
We quote the above merely as an incident indicating how 
ot~er trial Courts view the question which we are consid-
ering. 
SHERIFF OF THE COUNTY BEING PERMITTED TO 
TESTIFY AFTER THE DEFENDANT HAD RESTED, 
PLACING A DYING DECLARATION OF THE DE, 
CEASED IN EVIDENCE WHICH HAD .NOT BEEN 
.PREVIOUSLY ALLUDED TO IN THE TRIAL. 
Certainly no authority is needed to substantiate the fact 
that this was improper. Especially so when the Sheriff had 
bE-en on the stand twice previously on direct testimony and 
had not alluded to any such dying declaration, nor had any 
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foundation or notice for the admission of the same been laid. 
Counsel feel that it is also appropriate to refer to Section 
4860 of" the Code of Virginia which requires Grand Juries 
to endorse on the back of the indictment the names of wit-
nesses appearing before them. This is cited to explode any 
intimation that either the accused or counsel, from the in-
dictment, had notice that the Sheriff was a witness in the case 
and it certainly shows that the Sheriff was not a witness be-
fore the Grand Jury, his name not being endorsed on the 
indictment as above certified. 
It is apparent from the facts certified that this testimony 
was among the most damaging which was produced against 
the accused; especially so coming after the defendant had 
clof)ed his defense. 
FOR~I OF VERDICT. 
-~ s certified by the Court, the verdict read: '' W ~, the 
jury, find the accused guilty of murder in the second degree 
and fix his penalty to twenty years in prison." 
We think this verdict is not capable of a positive and defi-
nite w1derstanding of what the jury intended. If the word 
''to", had been "at" then the verdict would have been 
plain. Counsel for the accused are of the opinion that the 
jury were under the impression that the Court would fix the 
term of imprisonment and that by using the word "to'' they 
intended to limit the Judge to second degree murder and to 
twenty years. 
Certainly if there is a doubt as to what the jury intended, 
the accused is entitled to the benefit of that doubt and should 
not be subject to the maximum penalty of twenty years. 
We feel very much like quoting under this heading the lan-
guage used by Justice Campbell, as above quoted, under a 
previous sub-division of this brief, in the case of N orfollc & 
Western Railway Company v. Eley, at page 780: 
"Unless it can be seen that it would not result in injury to 
the defendant, the judgment ought to be reversed on ac-
count of it. '' 
INSTRUCTION ''D". 
This instruction reads as follows: 
''The Court instructs the jury that a mortal wound given 
with .a deadly weapon in the previous possession of the slayer, 
without any, or very slight, provocation, is prima facie 
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willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, and throws upon 
the prisoner the necessity of showing extenuating circum-
stances.'' · 
In Srnith v. Cornmonwealth, 155 Va., page 1111, at page 
1120, the following instruction, which is almost identical to 
instruction '' D'' above, was before the Court: 
''The Court instructs the jury that every killing done with 
a deadly weapon in the previous possession of the accused is 
p'rirna facie murder in the first degree.'' 
In the above case, Justice Holt delivering the opinion of 
the Court, and immediately following quotation of the last 
above instruction, has this to say: 
"Instructions are to be read in connection with the evidence 
to 'vhich they apply and so this instruction in this case did no 
harm, BUT ON A RETRIAL OF THE CASE IT SHOULD 
NOT BR GIVEN. A homicide is at times ACCIDEN!f ALand 
at times committed IN HEAT OF PASSION OR IN SELF-
DEFENSE. IN SUCH CASES THE INSTRUCTION 
WOULD BE HARMFUL.'' 
When the Court said above that instructions are ''to be read 
in ccnnection 'vith the evidence to which they apply, and so this 
instruction in this ca.se did no harm, but on a retrial of the 
case it should not be ,qiven", alluding to the case then being 
decided, it meant that the instruction did no harm in that case 
because there could have been involved no question of accident 
nor of the crime having been committed IN HEAT OF PAS-
SION OR SELF-DEFENSE because of the fact that in that 
case, as appears in the report of the same, on page 1114, the 
undisputed facts of the homicide were that it occurred "from 
ambush two gun shots were fired in rapid succession", but it 
will be plainly seen from the above quoted portion of the opin-
ion, even though there was nothing in the case reflecting ac-
cident or that the offense occurred in heat of passion or self-
defense ''on a retrial of the case it should not be given" . 
.And, too, the above quotation shows plainly that this Court 
has emphatically laid down that the instruction here complain-
ed of should not be given wherever there was involved a claim 
of accident or that the homicide resulted IN HEAT OF P A8-
8ION OR SELF-DEFENSE. Nothing could be more em-
phati<' than the concluding sentence of the immediate preced-
ing quotation to the effect ''a homicide is at times accidental 
and at times is committed in heat of passion or self-defense. 
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IN BU'CH CASES THE INSTRUCTION JtVOULD BE 
H.ARMFUL' 1• 
In the instant case the facts are undisputed, whether taken 
from the viewpoint of the Commonwealth or from the view-
point of the accused, that the incidents which lead up to the 
homicide in question resulted from a false accusation of the 
deceased against the accused, charging the accused with rob-
bery of his person, the taking· of his watch, demonstrating 
fully that what followed that accusation was "in heat of pas-
sion", while the entire evidence. of the accused and on his be-
half was to the effect that the deceased and his two brothers 
were rushing him with open knives and that he, the accused, 
told them to ''come no further'', immediately following which 
he -shot. From which it is beyond question that the defense 
was purely self-defense. 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON IN-
VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER AND AS.SAULT AND 
BATTERY. 
' Section 4920 of the Code reads: ''On an indictment for fe-
lonious homicide, the jury may find the accused not guilty of 
the felony but guilty of involuntary manslaughter''. 
In the case of Tucker v. Cornmonwealth, 159 Va., page 1038, 
at pages 1048 and 1049, Justice Hudg·ins, in delivering the 
opinion of the Court, says and quotes as follows: 
''Whatever the rule may be in other jurisdictions, in this 
State Code, 'Sections 4918, 4920 and 4393 have been held to 
be ·in, pari m.ateri(~ and should be read tog·ether. Judge Keith, 
in Burton & CO'nquest v. Com'lnonwealth, 108 Va. 892, 62 S. 
E. 376, 37'9, in commenting on the identical provisions in the 
Code of 1887, said: 
'' 'Our jurisprudence, in this and in other respects, may 
be amenable to criticism of schoolmen and logicians, but sub-
jected to the test of actual experience it has appeared in prac-
tice to be well that the law, after framing definitions and for-
mulating rules of conduct, should allo'v to courts and juries, 
in thtir appJicntion and enforcement, a certain latitude and 
discretion. And so it comes to pass that a man may be in-
dicted for murder of the first degree by the various means 
embraced in the statute, the evidence adduced may tend to the 
proof of the offense named in the indictment and none other, 
and ·yet the jury, acting under this discretion with which they 
have been_c~othed by the law, may find the offender guilty of ·a 
less· offense. And it is well in practice that it should be so, 
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else, owing to the tenderness of juries and their reluctance to 
hnpose the highest penalty, many crimes would go wholly un-
punished, and thus the rigor of the law would tend rather to 
the promotion than to the prevention of crime.' '' 
Counsel for the accused desires to state orally the reasons 
upon which the decision of the lower Court is complained of 
and for which a review is sought. 
·A copy of this petition was, on the 9th day of January, 1936, 
given to Charles B. Godwin, Jr., Commonwealth's Attorney 
for Nansemond County, who represented the Commonwealth 
in the trial of this case. 
It is desired that this petition be regarded as the appel-
lant's brief, the petitioner, however, reserving the right to 
amend, alter or abridge the same should he see fit to do so, at 
any time before the record is printed. 
Wherefore, your petitioner prays that a writ of error and 
s~tper.sedeas be awarded him, that the judgment of the lower 
Court be reviewed and reversed, and that this Court enter an 
order directing that the defendant be found not guilty or re-
mand the case for a new trial. 
Rtspectfully sub~tted, 
NORFLEET BELL, 
By Counsel. 
CRUMPLER & CRUMPLER, 
Counsel for Petitioner. 
We, William M. Crumpler, William .M. Crumpler, Jr., and 
Thos. L. Woodward, counsel practicing in the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia, hereby certify that in our judgment 
tlwre is error in the judgment complained of in the foregoing 
petition, and that the same should be reviewed and reversed. 
WILLIAM M. CRUMPLER, 
WILLIAM M. CRUMPLER, J.tt., 
THOS. L. WOODWARD. 
Received January 10, 1936. 
M. B. W. 
January 29, 1936. writ of error and supersedeas awarded 
by the court. No bond. 
M. B. W. 
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RECORD 
page 11 r VIRGINIA, 
In the Circuit Court of N ansemond Cou11ty. 
Commonwealth 
v. 
Norfleet Bell. 
AGREED RECORD FOR APPEAL. 
BILL OF EXCEPTION NUMBER 1. 
Be it remembered, that on the trial of this case the follow-
ing incidents occurred and the following constitutes -a narra-
tive of the evidence, respeetively, on behalf of the Common-
wealth and the defendant, and the said hereinafter record or 
transcript of the trial and its incidents includes a concise nar-
rative ·of all the evidence and developments complained of by 
the accused occurring during the progress of the trial. 
All matters and things preceding the actual trial of this case 
being agreed to have been regular and nothing· complained 
of by the defendant being· involved in any of the prelimi-
naries leading up to the actual trial of the accused, it is agreed 
by counsel, respectively, for the Commonwealth and for the 
accused that the following shall furnish a complete record of 
the said case and that all such preliminaries aforesaid shall 
be eliminated fron1 the record. 
The indictment was as follows: 
''Commonwealth of Virginia, 
In the Circuit C'ourt of N ansemond County. 
The Grand ,Jurors of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in and 
for the body of the County of N ansemond, and now attending 
the said Court at its January Term, 1934, upon their oaths 
do present that Norfleet Bell, on the 21st day of October, 1933, 
in the said County, in and upon Henry Harris, then and there 
being, feloniously, willfully, deliberately and of his malice 
aforethought, did make an an assault, and that the 
page 12 ~ said Norfleet Bell, with a certain shotgun charged 
and loaded with. powder and leaden shot, in and 
upon the body of the said 'Henry· Harris, then and there felo-
- --------
' 
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niously, willfully, deliberately and of his malice aforethought, 
did shoot, giving the said Henry Harris then and there, with 
the said shotgun the leaden shot aforesaid, upon the body of 
him, the said Henry Harris, mortal wounds, of which said mor-
tal WQunds, he, the said Henry Harris, then and there died. 
And so the Grand Jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths afore-
said, do say that the said Norfleet Bell did kill and murder 
the said Henry Harris in the manner and by the means afore-
said, feloniously, willfully, deliberately and of his malice 
aforethought, against the peace and dignity of the Common-
wealth of Virginia. '' 
A true bill. 
R. E. HODSDEN. 
The final order of the Court, to which the accused duly ex .. 
cepted, was as follows : 
"Virginia, in ·the Circuit Court of the County of N anse-
mond, on Tuesday, the lnth day of July, in the year of our 
Lord One thousand Nine Hundred and Thirty-five. 
Present: Hon. James L. McLemore, Judge. 
Commonwealth 
v. 
Norfleet Bell. 
Murder. 
ON MOTION. 
The Court having maturely considered the defendant's mo-
tion to set the verdict aside on the grounds stated in an or-
der entered by the Judge of this Court on the 1st day of June, 
1934, doth overrule the said motion. Thereupon it being de-
manded of the said Norfleet Bell if anything he had or knew 
to say why the Court should not now proceed to pronounce 
judgment against him and nothing being offered or alleged 
in delay thereof, it is considered by the Court that the defend-
ant be confined in the Penitentiary of this state for 
page 1? ~ a period of twenty (20) years. Thereupon the de-
fendant by counsel excepted to the judgment of the 
Court and it being suggested by counsel for the defendant that 
he desires to present a petition to the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia for a review and reversal of this judgment, 
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it is ordered that the execution of the judgment be suspended 
for a period of sixty (60) days." 
The Commonwealth introduced evidence tending· to pro.ve 
the following: 
That on the night of October 21st, 1933, in Pleasant Hill, 
Nansemond County, Virginia, a colored suburb of the City of 
Suffolk, Norfleet Bell shot and mortally wounded Henry Har-
ris with a shotgun, from which wounds Henry Harris died 
early in the morning of the 22nd day of Octo her, 1933, in Lake-
view Hospital, in the City of Suffolk, after an operation had 
been performed in an effort to save his life. 
That County ·Street runs North and South and intersects 
at rig·ht angles another street running East and West, in 
Pleasant Hill, and on the Northwestern corner of this intersec-
tion Baines Store is located. Just behind Baines Store and 
to the West was located the home of the d~eased. On the op-
posite side of the street from the Harris home but on the "\Vest 
end or corner of the opposite block was several vacant lots 
across which there ran, in a Southward direction, a foot-path 
with an oak tree standing about 75 yards from Baines Store, 
near the foot-path, and about 50 feet from the street on whieh 
Harris lived; that the defendant lived about three and one-
half blocks from Baines Store and in a Southwesterly direc-
tion and about two and one-half blocks from the oak tree 
standing in the vacant space ; 
That late in the afternoon of October 21st, 1933, the de-
ceased, Webster Harris, Joe Jacobs, Joe Williams, and a 
number of other colored men were engaged in a crap gam9 
in the rear of and to the South side of Baines Store near the 
Harris home, and while the game was in progress 
page 14 r the defendant came up and became an onlooker in 
the game. lVlr. Baines, on complaint, turned ou't 
the lights at the rear of the store, and the crowd mo~ed up 
to the front of the store near the street and continued to shoot 
crap. 
That during the progress of the g·ame the deceased missed 
his watch and accused the defendant of having stolen it, which 
the defendant denied, and which, in fact, was not true. A fuss 
ensued and in the altercation the deceased ran the defendant 
away from the g·ame. The defendant, in a short while, came 
back and the defendant was again run away ,by. the deceased. 
The defendant ran around Baines Store and in a Westerly 
direction down the intersecting street, across the vacant block 
and in the direction of his home ; 
That the garp.e was broken up and the crowd dispersed. 
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The deceased and his brother, Webster Harris, went to their 
home, and Pete King·, Clifton Davis and Nathaniel Freeman, 
who testified that they started to their homes and walked down 
the intersecting street until they reached the next corner and 
turned South, and had passed the oak tree in th~ vacant block 
when they saw the deceased running from the direction of his 
home and towards Baines Store ~ith a shotgun in his hands, 
and in a short time they heard the defendant call the deceased 
to him and heard the shot, and the defendant ran and called, 
"Artis". 
That after the deceased and his brother went home from the 
crap game, they ~tarted out in company with another brother, 
Charlie Harris, to go to another store to purchase cigarettes. 
They went West along the intersecting street to the next street 
parallel with County Street and turned North, and Charlie 
Harris purchased his cigarettes and they started back home, 
when approximately opposite the oak tree, the defendant 
called the deceased· to him and shot him. -
Charlie Harris, who testified substantially as follows, was 
corroborated by his brother, Webster Harris: 
That he and W ebst.er Harris are brothers of the dead man; 
that on the night of the killing he was in his mother's home 
and she appealed to him to go to Baines Store and 
page 15 ~ get him to stop the gambling which was in front of 
her door. Baines accordingly turned off the light 
that was shining on the spot where the game was being played, 
and the crowd then moved around to the side of the store and 
. the game proceeded accompanied by vile and profane lan-
guage. He did not know who was playing-but did know that 
one· of them was Norfleet Bell: 
That witness and his two brothers went to store some 
distanc~ away for cigarettes and upon their return, as they 
approached the house of his Mother, she called to Henry and 
told him she had his watch which he had said was gone-that 
he, witness, knew nothing of the watch controversy, but just 
as they were coming to the house the accused ''run across the 
vacant lot after he saw us pass, and we :was coming to the 
house and run about 20 steps from all three of us to the tree 
and called Henry", and Henry said, "Who is that, you Nor-
fleet'', and he said, ''Yes''-'' Come here'', and he shot as 
Henry approached within 8 or ten feet; that he did not see any 
gun but heard Norfleet say ''Lay down, God-damn it· and die'', 
etc., and then he ran. · · 
That he (Norfleet) was coming from the direction _of his 
home when he first ran by us before the shooting, and·aft~r the 
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shooting ran back towards his home; that he was standing be-
hind the oak tree when Henry approached at the time of the 
shooting, and that he (Charlie Harris and his brother) was 
about 20 steps from the place of shooting. Witness states 
that he was not drunk but had taken one drink and that he had 
been arrested once only in his life, and that was for driving 
a car under the influence. of liquor. 
At the conclusion of this witness' testimony the follow-
ing occurred: 
By ~Ir. Godwin, Commonwealth ~s Attorney (addressing his 
remark to Mr. Crumpler, defense counsel): 
Mr. God,vin: Are you going to put the Doctor on, Mr. 
Crumpler.? · 
Mr. Crumpler: Yes. 
pa~c 15a ~ 1\llr. Godwin: I want to find out about the na-
ture of his injuries. 
Mr. Crumpler: That is what I want. 
Mr. Godwin: Then I rest with the understanding that we 
call the Doctor. 
Deputies Ra,vles and Byrum in company with Hugh Brink-
ley, Constable. went to the scene of the killing about 9 P. M., 
shortly after the shooting. They saw the blood on the ground 
some four to seven feet from the oak tree in the vaeant lot 
where Harris fell. 
From thence they went to the home of Norfleet Bell, seeking 
to find him, but upon arriving there were told by his wife and 
mother that he had not been there. They then made 
page 16 ~ some search of the house for guns and found two 
single barrel guns, neither of which had apparently 
been fired for sometime. 
They left the house and went to Baines' Store where they 
remained for onlv a short time and returned to Norfleet's 
house for furthe; search at which time the wife of Norfleet 
said he had been there; changed his clothes and left. In ex-
amining the clothes they found an unexploded gun shell in his 
p::tnt!:_: pocket. They also found a double-barrel gun concealed 
between the mattress and springs in a room across the hall 
from the one usually occupied by Norfleet Bell. One barrel of 
this gun had· the appearance of having been recently fired. 
The wife of the defendant testified on behalf of the defend-
ant that ·.the defendant went hunting on the afternoon of Oc-
tober 21st, 1933, and came home after the sun had set, about 
light dusk; that supper was already cooked and ready, but 
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that the defendant did not eat, and went out, and later came ' 
back and changed his clothes and went away. 
That search was made for the defendant by the officers un-
til ~arch Hlst, 1934, when the defendant returned, employed 
counsel and surrendered in counsel's office. 
The testimony introduced by the accused was substantially 
as follows: 
Baines Grocery Store is located on the corner of two subur-
ban streets, Suffolk, Vir.ginia, facing one of these streets and 
siding to the other. At the rear corner of this store on the 
side street and on the ground a game of dice was in progress 
under an outside electric light controlled and operated from 
within by the owner of the store. The light was extinguished 
when the "game was transferred towards the front of the store. 
The deceased was eng·aged in the game which was in progress 
b~forc the accused arrived. The accused came up and was an 
onlooker for some minutes when the deceased, who had been 
driJ1].dng, got uj> and feeling for his watch, missed 
page 17 r it and charged the accused with taking it from his 
person which the accused denied. The deceased 
persisted in accusing the defendant while the latter persisted 
in denying the charge. The deceased with drawn knife then 
chased the accused down the side street which was in the di-
rection of the accused's home a first and second time. The de-
ceased threatened the accused several times such as "Some-
body is going· to Hell to-nig·ht", and, "It's life or watch". 
·Then all three brothers followed the accused a third time in 
the same direction down the side street. 
The accused claimed that he went to Baines Store to get 
cigarettes, that he had been hunting and hid the gun along 
said side street before going to Baines Store, alleging that 
he did the latter to prevent the boys from asking to borrow 
the gun and to avoid being teased for not having killed any-
thing; that when he was pursued the third time down said side 
street he obtained the gun and ran while the three brothers 
pursued him 'vith drawn knives, and that finally realizing 
that they were about to overtake him, turning he stopped, told 
them to come no further, which they failed to heed, and .that 
when within 8 faw feet, he shot. 
Down the side street was towards the home of the accused 
and the shooting occurred near an oak tree. about a block 
from Baines Store, the accused's home being about three 
and n half blocks from Baines Store in the same direction. 
Over the objections and exceptions of defense counsel, 
based upon the claim of irrelevance and that since the wit-
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nesses' character and reputation had not been put in issue 
that it could not be attacked or impeached by proof of prior 
conviction of crime nor by proof of particular facts, the Court 
permitted the Common,vealth 's Attorney repeatedly to ask de-
fense witnesses questions relative to certain past misdemean-
ors and felonies of which they had been convicted, as will 
appear from certain excerpts from the testimony of Joe 
Jacobs, Joe Williams and Jesse Boddy hereto attached,, as 
follows: 
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By Mr. Godwin: 
"JOE JACOBS 
(Col.): 
Q. How many times have you been in the penitentiary? 
A. Once. 
Q. How many times have you been on the road 7 
A. Once. · 
Mr. Crumpler: I· object to that. He can prove general 
reputation and if he has been to the penitentiary for perjury, 
he has a right to prove it, but- · · 
The Court: If it affects the witness' general credibility, I 
think you can prove the 'vitness has been convicted. 
Mr. Crumpler: Exception. 
By 1\ir. Godwin: 
Q; Have you been convicted of a felony two or three times f 
A. Twice. 
By Mr. Crumpler: 
Q. What were you convicted for Y 
A. For whiskey. · · 
Q. You didn't go to the penitentiary for that? 
A. I went there once. 
Q. What did you go forf 
A. Manufacturing whiskey. 
Q. How long has that been Y 
A. That was 1925. 
Q. Have you been in jail since then Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Nine years ago? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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By ~1r. Godwin: 
JOE WILLIAMS 
(Col.): 
· Q. How many times have you been up to the penitentiary! 
A. Nary one. 
Q. You are just out of jail for stealing :fish.? 
A. No, sir. 
Mr. Crumpler: That is a misdemeanor. He asked him he 
was just out of jail for stealing :fish. 
The Court: I think he can prove any crime that reflects 
upon him morally. 
Mr. Crumpler : Exception. 
By Mr. Godwin: 
Q. Were you in jail when this thing happened Y 
A. No, sir. 
page 19 ~ Q. Didn't you get convicted for stealing :fish and 
you were not out but about six days before they 
turned around and gave you six months for stealing wo·od 
from Crocker's Lumber Mill, and you are just out of jail for 
that¥ 
A. No, sir. 
Mr. Crumpler: I object to that and ask that it be stl'icken 
from the· record. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Mr. Crumpler : Exception. 
By Mr. Godwin: 
Q. Gave you six months for stealing? 
A. Not for stealing, give me six months but I don't know 
what it was for., because I didn't steal no lumber. 
Q. Had you been convicted before that for stealing :fish 1 
A. No, sir, another boy stole it· and brought it to the house 
and I was there. 
Q. Yon were convicted for it Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long did you serve that time Y 
A. 60 days. 
Q. You served 60 days for stealing :fish. You served 60 
days-
~fr. Crumpler: We are excepting to all of these questions. 
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By Mr. Godwin: 
Q. Yon served 60 days for that and were out about how 
fu~? . 
A. About three months. I got out the 16th of October and 
got arrested again the 13th of January. You can count it up. 
By. Mr. Birdsong: 
JESSE BODDY 
(Col.): 
.li.. Let me ask you one more question: You have been con-
victed for stealing chickens, haven't you? 
Mr. Crumpler: Objection and exception, your Honor. 
By Mr. Birdsong: 
Q. You have been convicted for stealing chickens! 
A. What do you mean by convicted Y 
Q. Tried, sentenced and given time for it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 20 } The accused did not put these witnesses' reputa-
tion in issue, but there 'vas a conflict between de-
fense witnesses, including the above witnesses, and those of-
fered. by the Commonwealth. 
The testimony disclosed that the deceased had left his watch 
with his· girl, who lived in the house next door to him and 
that while all the fuss was going on the girl gave the de-
ceased's mother his watch and his mother called him saying, 
"Henry, here's your watch", several times just before the gun 
fired. This testimony was undisputed. 
The accused put his own reputation in issue and the proof 
was undisputed that his reputation was good and that he had 
never before been arrested or charged with any offense. 
Among the instructions given for the Commonwealth was 
the following instruction designated as "D": 
. ''The Court instructs the jury that a mortal wound given 
with a deadly weapon in the previous possession of the slayer, 
without any, or very slight, provocation, is prima facie, will-
ful, deliberate and premeditated killing, and throws upon the 
·prisoner the necessity of showing extenuating circumstances." 
To the granting of the above instruction the accused, by 
counsel, assigned the following objections and exceptions: 
''While this instruction might" be proper in some cases un-
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· der the facts of the instant case it required more than the law 
justified. This .instruction likewise ignores the defendant's 
viewpoint doctrine and requires the defendant to show to the 
. jury that the defense was necessary to the protection of his 
.o_wn life or body.'' 
The defendant asked for the following instruction which 
was designat~d as "1-A": 
''The Court instructs the jury that murder by poison, lying 
in wait, imprisonment, starving, or by any willful, deliberate 
and premeditated killing, or in the commission of, or attempt 
to com:rait arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, is murder of the 
first degree, nnd is punishable with death, or confinement in 
the penitentiary for life, or for any term not less 
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~r urder in the second degree is all other murder 
than murder in ·the first degree as above defined but must 
be with malice aforethought. · There can be no murder in the 
first or second degree without malice aforethought. 
Murder in the second degree is punishable by confinement 
in the ·penitentiary not less than five years nor more than 
twenty years. 
Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human 
being, ·without malice aforethought, upon sudden passion or 
heat of blood caused by reasonable provocation or mutual 
combat and is punishable by confinement in the penitentiary 
not les8 than one nor more than five years. 
Involuntary manslaughter i~ where one person, while en-
gaged in an unlawful act, negligently kills another and is 
punishable by confinement in the penitentiary not less than 
one nor more than five years or in the discretion of the jury, 
by a fine of not exceeding $1,000.00, or confinement in jail not -
exceeding one y3a r, or both . 
.An assault and battery is where one person with force and 
violencH unlawfully does corporal hurt to another without ma-
licio.us or felonious intent and is· punishable by a fine not ex-
ceeding $500.00 or· confinement in. jail not exceeding twelve 
months, or both, in the discretion .of the jury.'' 
The <murt gave the first four paragraphs of the above in-
struction defining murder in· the first and second degree and 
voluntary ~anslaughter but refused the two last paragraphs 
above defining involuntary manslaughter and assault and bat-
tery. · 
To the granting of the above instruction the accused, by 
counsel, assigned the following objections and exceptions: 
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''This instruction related to a definition of and the punish-
ment attached to involuntary manslaughter and assault and 
battery and originally was ·a part of ''1-A'' granted by the 
Court on behalf ·of the defendant. Since the Court 
pnge 22 ~ of Appeals has held in the case of T'Ucker v. Oo~-
monwealth that even if the jury believe that the 
evidence tended to show a higher degree of crime and nothing_ 
less, yet it was within their province to convict of a lesser 
crime, this instruction should have been given." 
The Sheriff of the trial court, E. B. Rawles, went on the 
stand twice, first on direct examination, and the second time 
after the accused had rested and closed his case. Over the ob-
jee;tion and exception of counsel for the accused, he was per-
mit.ted to testify to a dying declaration of the deceased. For 
the purposes of the record and for the purposes of showing 
the objections and exceptions of counsel for the accused the 
direct examination of the Sheriff and the recalled examination 
are herein fully copied, as follows, together with the testimony 
of Dr .• T. R. Ellison, the testimony of these three witnesses 
disclosing the occurrence fully with reference to such dying 
declaration so testified to: 
E. B. RAWLES, 
sworn on behalf of the Commonwealth, testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Godwin: 
Q. Sheriff, on the :eight this murder happened you went to 
the hospital, did you not t 
A. I did. I received a call from Lakeview Hospital. that 
there was a man there who had been shot and his condition was 
serious, and they thought it well enough for me to come up and 
investigate. 
Q. You went from your homeY 
A. I went from my home. It was around 9:00 o'clock, some-
where around 9 :00, and I went direct from my. home to Lake-
view Hospital and I found this Henry Harris on the operat-
ing table. · 
By Mr; Crumpler: 
Q. On what! 
· A. They had him on a little table where they were getting 
.ready to treat him. 
By Mr. Godwin: 
Q. What was his condition, Sheriff? 
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Mr. Crumpler: I think that can be properly proved by the 
Doctor. 
page 2B ~ By Mr. Godwin: 
Q. What did you see Y 
A. I found Henry Harris there, clothes open here (indicat-
ing), and literally covbred with blood. I could not tell where 
he was shot at that time with his entire clothing bloody, and 
he "ras in condition that he was talking, and I asked him who 
shot hun and he told me-
1\{r. Crumpler: I object, your Honor. Unless the founda-
tion is first laid that he had been apprized of the fact that 
he was going to die, it is not a part of the r~s gestae. 
By Mr. Godwin: 
Q. ~rhen he was on the table was 'there any discussion or 
anything said to him about his condition, that you heard Y 
A. N·o, not that I heard. · 
Q. You didn't hear any Y 
A. :Ko, I didn't hear the doctors tell him that. 
Q. E:e was in such condition at that time that he could talkY 
A. ·Yes, he could talk. 
Q. .A.nd he was talking Y 
A. ·Yes, he talked to me and told me who shot him. 
Q. In addition to that, did you see his injury Y 
A. 'I'o a certain extent. I didn't get close to it, but I could 
tell it 1vas a wound in his stomach. I could tell that, and his 
clothes were open and literally covered with blood. 
Q. E[ow long did he live after that 7 
A. I understand he died that night. I didn't stay there un-
til the death, but I was informed the next morning that he 
died during· the night. 
Q. "You have been over to the scene where this shooting 
took place, haven't you Y 
.A. 1~ es, I ha;ve. 
Q. }"ou have been to the tree¥ 
A. I have. 
Q. lLnd you know where the accused lives Y 
A. 1:es. I have been knowing that quite awhile. 
Q. 8heriff, how far is it, approximately, from Baine's store 
to the tree where the shooting took place 7 
A. :Not to exceed 75 vards. 
Q. \Vhere did the Harris boy live 7 
A. He lived back of the store which would have 
page 24 ~ been in that 75 yards. 
Q. He lived between the store and the tree? 
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A. Yes, that is correct. He lived the :first house back of 
the store, and there was just a driveway between the house 
and store, I suppose ten or twelve feet, something like that 
By Mr. Crumpler: 
Q. That is the dead man you are talking about Y 
A. Where Harris' family lived, yes. 
By Mr. Godwin: 
Q. Where did the accused live? 
.A. He lived across another street in there-about-I would 
not imagine over 75 yards. It is across street. They don't go 
down in blocks like city blocks. This block from the store to 
the tree is not built up. There is only two houses along in 
that direction, and instead of going from the stor·e straight up 
here to the corner and crossing the street, which is about in 
this position (indicating), they cut through here and come 
diagonally across in that direction (indicating). 
Q. A short space in the square 1 
A. Yes, a short space in the square, not at the cot;ner at all. 
~here is no buildings along in that space. They cut across the 
blo-.!k in there. 
Q. About how far is it from the tree to where the accused 
here lives Y 
A. By the way they travel it is practically the same distance, 
75 to 100 steps. If you had gone all around the lot it is a good 
bit further. 
Q. These are paths all through there 7 . 
.A. Yes, and vacant lots, and pathways and things of that 
kind where they travel through. There are streets all the 
way around, bnt it is not the way the people go. They cut 
·through every block around there in that section. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Crumpler: 
Q. Sheriff, these blocks over there between the Streets are 
two lots deep, are they, the lots backing up to each othert 
A. Yes, very small lots and very small buildings. 
Q. The lots over there are 40 feet by 120, aren't· theyt 
A. Possibly. I haven't the dimensions, but I will say they 
are very small. 
Q. If they are 40 x 120, each block would be 240 feet, 
·wouldn't it? 
A. I haven't figured that up. 
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Q. When you leave the tree where the man was 
page 2!5 t shot, in going to his house you go right straight 
. across to another street, don't you; where Blanny 
King lives? 
A. From the tree to where Blanny l{ing lives there is a 
walkway. I don't think there is a driveway. 
Q. There is a street g·oing from one street to another which 
is the length of two lots? 
A. Two of those small lots. 
Q. Then there is the width of the street, and then you go 
down to this path you are talking about, out to the street Nor-
fleet lived on, and go to another street on the side of Blanny 
l{ing's house? 
A. ·Yes. 
Q .. And go out to another street¥ 
A. 1~es. 
Q. 8o that is the length of two lots, isn't it f 
A. "You mean to Blanny King's? 
Q. y·es. 
A. l~rom her back door back to the other, it is. 
Q. 'I'wo lots 1 
A. Yes, whatever the size of them are. 
Q. y· ou turn right when you get on that street to go up to 
his house, and that is the second house from the earner in 
that block? 
A. ·Yes. 
Q. 8o if you count the street to Blanny l{:ing's a block, and 
· that one lot up to the other corner, and then to your left, it 
would be three blocks of those kind of blocks? 
A. ,vv ell, they are blocks so to speak. 
Q. Jrrom where the shooting occurred f 
A. But those blocks there are not like city blocks. 
Q. I understand, but I am limiting it to two lots deep, which 
is 120 feet in length. I say limit it to the length of two lots. 
A . .-Yes. 
Q. It would be three blocks up to the other corner where he 
lives, wouldn't it? 
A. ·Not from the tree Y 
Q. ·yes, counting the paths. 
A. The tree isn't at the corner but back about three-say 
this is a block in here (indicating) that tree is about in this 
position, and must be about a half block off there. 
Q. The tree is back from the street f 
page 26 ~ A. It is practically a half block. 
Q. L-et's assume we are leaving the street instead 
of the tree. 
A. At what point? 
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Q. At this corner where the hedge is, which is opposite the 
tree, the street nearest the tree, the oak tree, and the corner 
from Baine's StoreY 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you leave that street, over to Blanny King's is the 
length of two lots 7 
A. Yes, of· course, it is. 
Q. Then you have a street to . the other side of Blanny 
King's which is . two 7 
A. Up to the front from this street there would be-from 
this block would be a street, yes. 
Q. Then you start from here straight over to the next street, 
which is between the street she lives on and the street on 
which Norfleet lives 7 
A. Counting the building here, the lot as one, and the vacant 
lot back of it. 
Q. Is two more lots? 
A. Counting her lot would be two lots. 
Q. Yes. 
A. And ·the one back of her is vacant. 
Q. And when you turn right going up to his house you have 
to go to the length of another block with the exception of the 
store on the corner Y 
A. I think there are three buildings. 
Q. Four buildings. 
A. Four buildings on the block. 
Q. And two or three vacant lots Y 
A. Two or three vacant lots, then the vacant lots that come 
around to back of her house, and you get to her ho~se around 
this way. They don't go to the corner and cross around over 
the corner, but come up these paths. 
Q. So, practically 'vith the exception that the tree is set-
ting back a little ways from the street, it would be practically 
four blocks up to his house, such block as there are t 
A. From the tree it isn't. 
Q. Three blocks, I mean. 
A. If you :figure it that way. 
Q. Then going to Baines' store is another full 
page 27 ~ block from the street Y · 
A. Yes, sir. There are four buildings back of 
his store. 
Q. And v-acant property? 
A. Yes, some vacfl,nt property. 
Q. If he had gone around the other way, if a person go-
ing from Blanny King's across to the tree, had turned right 
and gone down the road, and then turned south going up to 
B~ines·' store, on the corner, it would be further, would itt 
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A. vVhy, certainly it ·would. 
Q. It would be about three or four blocks Y 
A. It would depend upon the way you, go, of course. 
DR. J. R. ELLISON, 
sworn on behalf of the defendant, testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Crumpler, Jr. : 
Q. ·You are Dr. J. R. Ellison, a physician at Lakeview Hos-
pital, Suffolk 7 
A. ·Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you recall, on the night of October 21st, 1933, a col-
ored n1an, a patient, being admitted 11o the hospital by the 
name of Henry Harris? 
A. 'Yes. 
Q. vVhat was the nature and extent of his injury? 
A. lie had been shot in the lower left abdomen with a shot-
~a . . 
Q. J.d about what point¥ Indicate with a pencil on me. 
A. ~rust a hove the groin in the left side. 
Q. I~ight there (indicating)? 
A. ~res, along in there. He had been shot with a shotgun 
and the shot made a hole the size of a silver dollar, and his 
intestines were hang·ing out of the wound, and he was very 
much shocked and in right much pain. 
Q. 1Nbere did you find the wa~ding from the shot Y 
A. There were pieces of the wadding in his cloth-
page :28 ~ ing and down in the wound. · 
Q. Down in the body Y 
A. y·es. 
Q. ~rhat had penetrated through his clothing and gone intq 
his body? 
A.. ·Yes, that is right. 
Q. :How far would you say they had gone into the wound Y 
A. Possibly a half inch or inch, down in the mass of blood. 
Q. ·you knew from finding the wads there a shotgun had 
been used to inflict the wound? 
A. Yes. You could see the shot hanging around close in 
the edge of the wound. 
Q. The little shot t 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did he die Y 
A. He did. 
Q. At what time did he die, do you recall Y 
A. About 1 :50 the next morning. 
Q. Early in the morning, just after midnight f 
A. Yes. .... 
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Q. Doctor, what would you say from the nature and extent 
of the wound as to how far the dead man was from the gun 
at the time it was fired Y 
A. I would say he was fairly close. I am not an expert, but 
from the size of the wound, I would judge that he was ·a very 
few feet. 
Q. A very few feet Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. As a matter of fact, you have on your chart, your records 
in your hosiptal there, a notation at close rangeY 
.l\. Yes. 
Q. Doctor, what kind of clothes do you recall Henry Harris 
had on when he came in Y 
.A. I could not tell you to save my life. 
Q .. Yon don't recall Y 
A. No. 
Q. Did he have a coat and vest on Y 
· A. I don't remember. 
page 29} Q. Doctor, in your opinion, if that gun had been 
eight feet or six or seven steps away from the 
dead man at the time it was fired, could the wadding have 
penetrated the clothing and the wound to the extent that it 
did? 
A. I don't know. I wouldn't form an opinion on that. 
Q. You do say that in your opinion it must have been at 
close range, to the ·extent, I believe you said, of three or four 
feet? I understand that" is an opinion, however . 
.. ll. Approximately that, I reckon. · 
Q. That is what your idea is f 
A. Yes. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Godwin: 
., Q. Was it wadding that follows the shot that you found in 
the wound? 
A. It was fragments and looked like wadding that followed 
the shot. 
Q. Fragments of it Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't find it' whole; it was blown to pieces f 
A. Yes, it was blown to pieces. 
Q. Yon say you knew was a shotgun on account of the size 
of the hole, and you found shot scattered around in the flesh, 
around the wound Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was it fired far enough away for it to separate some! 
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A. v·ery little. 
Q. v·ery little Y 
A. Y'es; just hanging on the side that the shot went in. 
Q. Aroup.d what time, do you remember, he was brought 
there¥ 
A. I think he 'vas brought in about 8 :00. 
Q . .A .. bout 8 :00 o'clock Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. F'rom the wound you tell from what angle he was shot Y 
A. Possibly a little to the left. 
Q. Standing a little to the left. Did it blow a hole clear 
through him Y . 
A. Clean into the inside of the abdomen. 
page BO ~ Q. Clean into the inside of the abdomen Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. J·ust over his left hip, was it Y 
A ... About half-way and between the groin and-
Q. In the lower part of his abdomen 
A. ~t es, over his groin. 
Q. Did you all operate on him Y 
A. ~'i:es. 
Q. Did you apprize him of his condition Y 
. ~ 
A. He never regained consciousness after the accident-
after the operation. 
Q. Before the operation was he apprized of his condition Y 
A. -Yes. 
Q. :Eie was told how serious it was? 
A. 1rhat he was in pretty bad shape. 
Q. ·was he told before Sheriff Rawles got there Y 
A. I don't remember. I don't remember when the· Sheriff 
got there. 
Q. :He fully realized what might happen to him, did heY 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. Did he talk to you about it, tell you who did it! 
A. No. 
Q. He didn't say anything to you about it 1 
A. No. 
Q. When the Sheriff came, were you there f 
A. Yes, I remember the Sheriff being there. 
Q. Do you remember him talking to the Sheriff about itY 
A. No. 
Q. You were not in there when he was talking to · the 
Sheriff? 
A. I might have been, but if I was I was busy working on 
the n1an. 
Q. Do you remember stepping aside so the Sheriff could 
talk to him¥ 
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A. Possibly. 
Q. Did he then know his condition; had he been apprized 
of it at that time Y 
page 31 ~ A. Yes, I think he had been told he was liable to 
pass out. 
Q. Were you there when he was searched Y 
A. No. 
Q. You don't know :what they found on him? 
A. No. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Crumpler, Jr.: 
Q. Doctor, you say that in all probability the deceased was 
a little to the left when he was shot. You mean to the left of 
the man who was doing the shooting Y 
A. I mean the shot entered from the left side and went to-
wards the middle. 
Q. Entered from the left side Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. You mean at an angle like this (indicating) 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. In other words, yon mean that the shot entered the body 
when the deceased was in the position a man would have been 
in if ready to stab another with a knife? 
A. Possibly. 
Mr. Crumpler: Stand aside. 
page 32 ~ SHERIFF E. B. RAWLES, 
recalled, on behalf of the Commonwealth, testi-
fied as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Godwin: 
Q . .Sheriff, did you talk to Thomas Harrell Wright of this 
shooting when you were bringing him back from the hos-
pitals? · 
A. No; Norfleet Whittaker, I did. 
Q. Did he, when you were bringing him back from the hos-
pital tell you he didn't know anything about this shooting"? 
A. He did. 
Q. Now, Sheriff, Dr. Ellison testified that prior to the time 
that you talked to the deceased that he had been apprized of 
his cqndition. Did you talk to the deceased about this caseY 
A. I did. 
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lYir. Crumpler: I object. 
Bv Mr. G-odwin: 
• Q. \\That did the deceased tell you Y 
Mr. Crumpler: I object unless the deceased recognized in 
the presence of the witness and the witness divulged to the 
deceaeed that he was going to die or it was necessary. that 
he should die. 
The Court: I don't think that is the basis. 
Mr. Crumpler, Jr.: And on the further ground that qying 
declarations are not proper rebuttal but proper on direct ex-
amination. 
·The Court: I think the basis of a dying declaration is the 
fact that the dying· man is conscious of the fact that' his end 
is near or most probably near, or, as the law says in articulo 
morti.~; in the ja,vs of death, and the Doctor testified he did 
tell him he was going to die or was expected to die. I think 
that rnakes it admissible. 
Mr. Crumpler: The Doctor testfied he told him of his con-
dition. but there is no testimony to the effect. that he told him 
he wa.s going to die, but told him his condition 'vas serious. 
The Court: I think the Doctor said more than that. I think 
he sai[d he knew probably he was g·oing to die. 
Mr .. Crumpler: Your Honor, a few minptes ago, ruled when 
another question was asked that this was not proper rebuttal 
testin1ony. We insist that it is not. 
Th•3 Court: I don't know about that, but you put on testi-
mony here a few minutes ago. 
!1:r. Crumpler : When I put on the witness a few minutes 
ago r.ay case was not closed. The Commonwealth's case was 
closed this morning. .A.t the present time the defense's case 
is closed, and he is putting on direct testimony. 
1\{r. Godwin: I asked Sheriff Rawles these ques-
page 33 ~ tions this morning on direct examination and at 
- that time the doctors had not come and I could not 
prov•3 the statement until .the doctor went on the stand, and I 
closed with the understanding that I could put him on the 
stand. Beside tha:t, I expect this testimony to contradict what 
thesE! witnesses have said for the defense about this case. 
Mr.- Crumpler: You closed with the understanding that we 
were going to put the doctors on the stand to 'the extent of 
proving the man was dead. I told you we would have to 
prove that. 
The Court: I will allow the testimony. 
Mr. Crumpler: Exception. 
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By Mr. Godwin: 
Q. What did he tell you, Sheriff? 
A. I asked him if he knew who it- was shot him and he said 
yes, it was Norfleet Bell shot him, and I asked him how he 
knew it was him and he .said beeause he called him, that just 
before he shot he called to him. 
Mr. Godwin: That is all. 
Mr. Crumpler : Stand aside. 
The verdict of the jury reads as follows: ''We, the jury, 
find the accused guilty of murder in the second degree and 
fix his penalty TO twenty years in prison. 
A. L. NORFLE·ET, Foreman." 
Thereupon the attorneys for the defendant moved the Court 
to set aside the verdict because it is contrary to the law and 
the evidence and without evidence to support it and more par-
ticularly but not to limit the general grounds so stated as 
follows: 
lst. Because certain instructions were given for the Com-
monwefllth which ought not to have been given. 
2nd, Because certain instructions were refused for the de-
fendant which ought to have been given. 
3rd. Because certain instructions offered by the defend-
ant were altered, modified and changed by the 
page 34 ~ Court. 
4th. Because the Court admitted evidence which 
should have been excluded. 
5th. Because the Court refused evidence offered by the 
defendant which ought to have been admitted. 
6th. Because the Court admitted, in particular, a dying 
statement of the deceased which was improper to have been 
admitted and for which sufficient and legal foundation to the 
admission of the same had not been laid. Likewise because 
said dying statement constituted direct evidence and was of-
f~r·ed in rebuttal after the Commonwealth had rested and after 
the defendant had rested. 
7th. Because the jury remained from the Court Room only 
seventeen minutes by reason of which it was impossible for 
them to have read and properly considered the instructions 
of the case or to have discussed the evidence between them-
selves. 
8th. Because the Court required the case to be finished on 
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the day of its beginning which was Friday, June 1st, 1934, an 
hour of argument being allotted to each side, which necessi-
tated the conclusion of the argument between twelve and one 
o'clock that night and by reason of which fact neither counsel 
for the accused nor the jurors were .in mind and body fresh 
and clear for a sufficient and proper discussion or considera-
tion of the case. 
9th. Because the jury's verdict :is irregular, uncertain, in-
definite and does not with certainty fix punishment or the 
term of imprisonment. 
lOth. And any other circumstances of law or fact which 
might be taken advantag·e of under the general claim that the 
verdict is contrary to the law and' the evidence, or any other 
evidence of fact or rulings of the Court shown by the steno-
graphic record of the case. 
And this· cause is continued for a later hearing: of the 
said motion. 
page 35 }- Other instructions granted by the Court on be-
half of the Commonwealth were as follows: 
'' 'I'he Court in~tructs the jury that the law of se~f-de­
fense i.s the law of necessity, and that to make out a case 
of sel~-defense in a case of homicide, the accused must show 
to the jury that the defense was necessary to protect his own 
life, or to protect himself against grievious bodily harm; and 
that with regard to the necessity that will justify the slaying 
of another in self-defense, the accused must not have wrong-
fully occasioned the necessity, for a man shall not in any case 
justify the killing of another by a pretense of necessity, unless 
he were without fault in bringing that necessity upon him-
self." · 
''The Court instructs . the Jury that if you believe from 
the evidence that the accused and .the deceased had a quarrel; 
that the deceased was at fault in bringing about the quarrel; 
that after the quarrel the accused 'vent and secured a loaded 
shot gun, and sought out the deceased and called the deceased 
to him and willfully, deliberately and premeditatedly shot and 
killed the deceased, you shall find the aecused guilty of mur-
der in the first degree.'' 
''The. Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
e\·idcnce that the killing was done with a deadly weapon, then 
the. law presumes it was done ,~th malice,. and it is for the 
defense to satisfy the minds of the jury that it was not done 
with malice.'' 
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Other instructions granted by the Court on behalf of the 
accused were as follows: 
"The Court instructs the jury that when a person reason-
ably apprehends that another, or others, intends to attack him 
for the purpose of killing him or doing him serious bodily 
harm, then such person has a right to arm himself for his own 
necessary self-defense.'' 
page 36 ~ ''The Court instructs the jury that if one is un-
justifiably and feloniously assaulted he does not 
have to retreat, but may stand his ground and repel force by 
force may use such force as to him may seem reasonably neces- . 
· sary to repel the attack, even to the taking of the life of the 
assailant.' ' 
''The Court instructs the jury that. the law presumes every 
pe"rson charged with crime to be innocent until the Common-
wealth has established his guilt by evidence so strong, so 
clear, and so conclusive, that there is left in the minds of the 
been proved beyond every reasonable doubt, the presumption 
is an abiding presumption, and goes with the accused through 
the entire case and applies at every stage thereof until over-
.come by proof. 
And in this connection the jury is instructed that it is never 
sufficient that the accused, upon speculative theory or con-
jecture may be guilty; or that by the preponderance of the 
testimony his guilt is more probable than his innocence; for 
until nil t';:wtR a.nd circumRtances necessary to his guilt have 
been proved hl·ryoud every rea~onable doubt, the presumption 
of innocence· still applies, and the accused must be acquitted.'' 
''The Court instructs the jury that the burden of showing 
guilt of the accused to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt, 
is upon the Commonwealth, and . this burden never shifts. 
While the Commonwealth by its evidence may establish such 
facts as to justify an inference of guilt if not rebutted by the 
· accused, still, if upon consideration of all the evidence there is 
reasonable doubt of guilt, he should be found not guilty.'' 
''The Court instructs the jury that after considering the 
facts adduced in the testimony that even if you should reach 
the conclusion that the accused is guilty and that he did not 
act in self-defense, and even if you should reach the further 
conclusion that the testimony tends to prove murder and no 
other crime, yet the law invests you with a discretion as to 
whether you should find the accused guilty of. murder and 
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·.: under the law in the exercise of that discretion 
page 37 ~ It is within your province~ to find the accused guilty 
· of an offense less than murder.' ' 
(~ f I 
. ~·'The Court instructs the jury that in order to convict the 
accused the facts and circ:umstances surrounding the shooting 
must not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but 
such facts and circumstances must be actually inconsistent 
with the innocence of the accused beyond every reasonable 
doubt." - ·. ( · ,. 
'": ~ jO ~ '- f 
''The Court instructs the jury that the flight of a person 
accused of crime raises no presumption of guilt, but is merely 
evidence tencling ~o show guilt to be . considered by the jury · 
and given such weight as they deem proper in connection 
with other pertinent and material facts and circumstances in 
the case.'' 
''1:'he. Court instructs the Jury that the defendant's pre-
sumption of innocence in doubtful cases is always sufficient to 
turn the scale in his favor.'' 
''The Court· instructs the jury that murder is distinguished 
from voluntary manslaughter by the absence of malice afore-
thought. There ·can be no murder without malice afore-
thought.'' 
''The Cou-rt instructs the jury that ·malice aforethought 
means the thought of taking life and must have been con-
.sciously conceived in the mind; the conception must have been 
meditated upon and a deliberate determination formed to 
do the act, that is to kill.'' 
".The Court instructs the jury, as a matter of law, that the 
mere charge or indictment ag·ainst the defendant does not 
justify any inference as to the guilt of the defendant." . 
··. ''The Court instructs the jury that all killing is not un-
1awfuL The law of self-defense permits one who honestly 
and reasonably believes that he is in danger of death or seri-
ous bodily injury to defe~d himself against his adversary, or 
adversaries, even to the extent of taking life, .and 
page 38 } if you believe the defendant acted under such cir-
cumstances you should find him not guilty." 
' . ''The Court instructs the jury that malice, however great, 
.:cannot be considered if you believe the defendant shot to save . 
:h®self from: death pr serious bodily injury.'' -
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. ''The Court instructs the jury that the test of criminal in-
tent in the use of a deadly weapon is to be found, not in .the 
manner in which or the purpose for which the previous pos~ 
session of the weapon was acquired, but in its deliberate use. 
for a deadly purpose.'' 
--
''The Court instructs the Jury that the __ voluntary return 
of the prisoner surrendering himself for trial is a circumstance 
which they should consider along with the other evidence in 
deterrrJining his guilt or innocence.' '_ ~- · 
''The Court instructs the J ucy that if the testimony on 
behalf of the accused creates in the minds of . the jury any 
reasonable doubt as to his guilt he is entitled ta ~ acq¢tte~ '' 
''The Court instructs the jury that they are the sole judges 
of the credibility of all witnesses and that they ~y dis-
regard the evidence of any witness or witnesses if -in- ,the 
judgment of the jury either or any of the witnesses. are not 
worthy of belief.'' 
page 39 }- And on the 16th day of July, 1935;the!defend-
- ant's motion for a new trial, based "i:!pon ~p.~ _fore-
~oing disclosures. was argued before the Court both on behalf 
of the Comn10nwealth and on behalf of the defendant_, after 
which the Court reserved its decision for several ·days-. but 
·after which it declined to grant a new trial to which action 
of the Court (lounsel for the defendant then and- there ex-
cepted tn the action and ruling of the said Court -in· refusing 
to grant his motion for a new trial and in refusing to set aside 
the 'verdict of the jury awarding him a new trial,' -as well as 
to the entering of a judgment in said verdict, and. the said de-
fendant tenders this his one Bill of Exceptio~,- ·aft~r rea-
sonable notice in writing to the Commonwealth's Atto_rney, as 
required by law, which notice was in words and ·:f;igures as 
follows: 
''Suffolk, Va., Sept. 7th, 1935. 
To C. B. Godwin, Jr., Commonwealth's Attorney of Nanse-
m.ond County, Virginia: 
N: otice is hereby given you that at 10 o'clock A. M., on the 
12th day of September, 1933, we will apply to the Honor-
able James L. McLemore, Judge of the Circuit Court of Nan-
semond County, in his office, in Suffolk, Va., to certify the 
record and sign all bills of exception deemed necessary in this 
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case,,Commonwealth v. Norfleet Bell (at which time and place 
such record and such bills of exception will be tendered), and 
that we will at 12 o'clock M., noon, on the same day and year 
aforesaid, apply to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Nanse-
mond County, Virginia, at the Clerk's Office of the said 
County, for a transcript of said record in said case and for due 
certification and authentication of the record and bills of ex-
ception. 
. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CRUMPLER & CRUMPLER, 
Attorneys for N orfieet Bell.'' 
And the defendant prays that his Bill of Exception No. 1 
may be signed, sealed and made a part of the record which is 
· accordingly done this 12th day of September, 1935, 
page 40 ~ in the time allowed by law . 
. JAMES L. McLEMORE, Judge. (Seal) 
A true copy 
,J.A.MES L. McLEMORE, Judge. (Seal) 
Filed September 12th, 1935. 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of N ansemond 
County, Virginia, on the 12th day of September, 1935. 
I, John H. Powell, Clerk, of the Circuit Court of the County 
of Nansemond. Virginia, do certify that the foregoing is a 
true trasncript of the record in the case of Commonwealth of 
Virginia v. Norfleet Bell, lately pending in said Court. 
I further certify that the same was not made up and com-
pleted and delivered until the plaintiff, the Commonwealth of 
Virginia through its proper Com. Atty. had received reason-
able notice thereof and of the intention of the defendant to 
apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for a writ 
of error and supersedeas to the judgment therein. 
JOHN H. POWELL, Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste: · 
· M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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